On 9 May 2026, Péter Magyar was sworn in as Hungary's new Prime Minister, ending Viktor Orbán's 16-year autocratic rule following the Tisza Party's landslide victory in the April 2026 parliamentary elections, in which it secured 141 of 199 seats and a constitutional supermajority. This historic transition of power poses certain questions on Hungary’s future examined in the public lecture, given by researcher professor Dr. Tímea Drinóczi at Mykolas Romeris university (MRU) Public Security Academy, on 6 April 2026. The lecture formed part of the International Teaching Week and was moderated by Prof. Dr. Jolita Miliuvienė, associate professor at the Institute of Public Law in MRU Law School. Hungary's new government now faces the precise challenges of constitutional reconstruction, rule-of-law restoration, and democratic reform that Prof. Dr. Tímea Drinóczi addressed.
Hungary’s Illiberal Constitutional Development and the Mandate for Change
Firs of all, the lecture examined Hungary’s illiberal and increasingly autocratic constitutional system as it has developed over the past 16 years. It highlighted the erosion of the rule of law, weakening of institutional checks and balances, and restrictions affecting human rights and democratic institutions. It also addressed the broader consequences of this process, including strained relations with international partners, in particular the European Union.
Against this background, the lecture turned to the political situation following the 2026 elections, which created a renewed democratic mandate for constitutional change. It explored both the opportunities and the risks of constitutional reconstruction, emphasizing that a constitutional majority enables reform but does not by itself determine how such reform should be carried out.
Concrete Reform Proposals: Term Limits and Veto Players
The lecture discussed concrete reform proposals that are currently at the level of political commitments. These include introducing term limits for the Prime Minister and potentially removing key veto players if they do not resign. Term limits were presented as an innovative instrument and a necessary signal that, in the future, no power remains unchecked. At the same time, their effectiveness is likely to remain limited unless they are embedded in broader structural reforms aimed at reconstructing constitutional democracy.
A European Legal Framework for Constitutional Reconstruction
This reconstruction, however, cannot be achieved without removing key veto players. This intervention raises significant rule-of-law concerns. To address this tension, the lecture outlined a framework of public justification based on European legal standards. First, national constitutional identity cannot be invoked in a manner contrary to that of the European Union, which imposes substantive limits on such arguments. Second, context matters: as emphasized most explicitly in Advocate General Ćapeta’s Opinion in Case C-225/24 (12 February 2026), assessments must prioritize systemic and contextual analysis, particularly in situations of democratic backsliding. Third, in Case C-769/22 Commission v Hungary, the Court confirmed that Article 2 TEU is legally binding, forms part of the EU’s constitutional identity, and imposes horizontal obligations on Member States to respect the values enshrined in Article 2. Fourth, the Venice Commission’s Updated Rule of Law Checklist provides guidance for restoration contexts, including the acceptance of deviations from rule-of-law principles when they are justified as necessary and proportionate in light of the restoration objectives. It also requires assessing the context, grounding measures in international hard and soft law applicable to the particular state body, and ensuring participatory decision-making.
The Procedural Dimension: Legitimacy and Participation
Prof. Dr. T. Drinóczi emphasized that constitutional reconstruction also has a crucial procedural dimension. In the Hungarian system, where constitutional change depends merely on a two-thirds parliamentary majority, this majority must be constrained by procedural requirements. Inclusive participation, transparent decision-making, and public justification are essential to ensure this procedural legitimacy. Without such safeguards, there is a risk of reproducing the same patterns of concentrated power that characterized the previous regime.
The lecture concluded that the most far-reaching interventions, such as removals from office, may in some cases be avoided due to the broader political and non-legal consequences of the collapse of Orbán’s regime, or even by the initiation of such processes. Nevertheless, even in these scenarios, robust legal and constitutional justifications remain indispensable.
