David Schultz, Professor of Political Science at Hamline University, USA, Visiting Lecturer at Mykolas Romeris University (MRU), and a member of the MRU LAB Justice Research Laboratory

As the US midterm elections on November 3 approach, the political landscape appears favourable to the Democrats. However, the reality is more complex than most forecasts suggest. Will the Democrats be able to capitalise on President Donald Trump's unpopularity, and what would the election results mean for Lithuania?

The Democrats' Chances of Victory

According to the latest Quinnipiac poll, President Donald Trump's approval rating stands at just 33% – lower than George W. Bush's ahead of the 2006 midterm elections, when Republicans lost control of both chambers of Congress. Among independent voters, only 22% approve of Trump. Fuel prices have risen since the war with Iran began in February, while just 23% of Americans approve of the president's handling of the cost of living.

Democrats lead Republicans by 11 percentage points in generic congressional ballot polls – 49% to 38%. Moreover, 73% of Democratic voters consider these elections more important than previous midterms, compared with 52% of Republicans.

The electoral map also appears favourable to the Democrats. Republicans hold a narrow majority in the House of Representatives, with 220 seats to the Democrats' 215, meaning Democrats would need a net gain of just three seats to take control. In the Senate, Republicans hold 22 of the 35 seats up for election. Even traditionally Republican states such as Kansas, Iowa and Texas could become competitive.

The Democratic Party's Image Problem

Nevertheless, Trump's unpopularity does not guarantee a Democratic victory. While 58% of Americans view the Republican Party unfavourably, perceptions of the Democratic Party are even worse, with 59% expressing negative views. Only 48% of Democratic voters view their party's representatives in Congress favourably, compared with 62% of Republicans.

In the 2024 elections, Republicans outnumbered Democrats in party identification for the first time since exit polls began tracking this measure. Democrats also lost support among Hispanic voters, younger men and working-class voters.

Since 2016, the Democrats' central political message has been opposition to Trump. This strategy proved successful in 2018 and 2020 but failed in 2016 and 2024. Today, more than three-quarters of Democratic voters describe their motivation for voting as opposition to the president. However, that motivation alone may not be enough.

Four possible election scenarios stand out. Under the "blue wave" scenario, Democrats would win approximately 253 seats in the House of Representatives and 53 in the Senate, securing clear majorities in both chambers. Under the baseline "purple puddle" scenario, their victory would be considerably narrower, with around 225 House seats and 51 Senate seats. The third scenario envisages strong Republican resistance, with Republicans narrowly retaining control of the House while the battle for the Senate remains unpredictable. Finally, the "red sea" scenario would represent a Democratic failure, with the party's negative public image preventing it from taking control of the House.

Structural conditions alone would suggest that Democrats could win approximately 248 House seats, but the party's negative image reduces that projection to around 225. In my assessment, the Democrats have a 55–62% chance of winning the House of Representatives and a 50–55% chance of taking control of the Senate.

Three Factors That Could Change the Election Results

First, an unpopular president does not necessarily mean unpopular Republican candidates. Republican voters remain loyal to their representatives in Congress, while most congressional districts are safely held by one party. Trump's unpopularity is therefore likely to have the greatest impact in 30–40 competitive districts and a handful of states with closely contested Senate races.

Second, polls can be wrong. In 2016, 2020 and 2024, they underestimated Trump's support. If this pattern repeats, the Democrats' current advantage could disappear.

Third, Hispanic voters could play a decisive role. In 2024, they shifted noticeably towards the Republicans. Whether these voters return to the Democrats, remain loyal to the Republicans or stay home altogether could determine the outcome in competitive districts in Texas, Arizona, California and Nevada.

What Would the Election Results Mean for Lithuania?

For Lithuania, the most important question is whether a change in the composition of Congress could influence US policy towards Ukraine, NATO and Russia.

The answer is: less than one might expect. The president continues to play the leading role in US foreign policy. Even if Democrats gain control of one or both chambers of Congress, Trump would retain considerable influence over decisions concerning relations with Vladimir Putin, US commitments to NATO's eastern flank and the presence of American troops in Lithuania. Congress cannot negotiate directly with Moscow, and a presidential veto can only be overridden by a two-thirds majority, which the Democrats would not have.

Nevertheless, a Democratic-controlled Congress could serve as an important counterweight. Through its budgetary powers and the annual National Defense Authorization Act, Congress could allocate funding for assistance to Ukraine and restrict the withdrawal of US forces from Europe. It could also hold hearings, demand documents and publicly scrutinise potential agreements with Russia reached without consulting allies. Such measures would increase the political cost of unilateral decisions, although they would not eliminate the risks entirely.

For Lithuania, the priority should be to prepare for uncertainty rather than rely on any particular election outcome. A Democratic victory could make a sudden US withdrawal from the Baltic region more difficult, but it would not prevent it entirely. Lithuania's security should therefore continue to rest on strong national defence, close cooperation with European partners and US commitments firmly established in both Congress and the White House.

Ultimately, the outcome of these elections will depend on more than Trump's unpopularity. The central question is whether Democrats can persuade Americans to vote for them, rather than simply against the current president. The answer will also shape the security prospects of Europe's eastern flank.